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Teaching and Democratic Values in Higher Education 
Allen F. Harrison 
"What you see is what you get — consistency , persistency, and mediocrity in classrooms."1 
I. 
Every Wednesday evening, in the small Southwestern 
state college where I once taught, I would spend a few min-
utes at intervals roaming the halls, peering in at classrooms, 
listening to the drone of professorial voices, trying to get a 
sense of the process operating in those rooms. My senior 
students had been set to work in small groups for a half hour 
or so, sharing the learning of techniques for business policy 
analysis. It was during those periods that I would wander. 
After a number of these interludes I began to formulate 
several observation-based principles, which in time tended 
toward a generalized hypothesis. 
My observations were these: 
1. In the typical college classroom, very little happens. 
Professors lecture, occasionally scrawl something on a 
chalkboard, or show something on a screen with an over-
head projector. Students take notes or don't. Apart from 
minor body adjustments on the parts of all concerned, that 
is ah that happens in a typical class period of, say, fifty to 
seventy-five minutes. 
2. Students invariably sit in rows and columns of school-
room chairs. Most of the males slouch. Professors in-
variably stand at a lectern. No one moves, ever, during a 
class, except for the occasional random adjustment men-
tioned above. 
3. The affect of the students, even from a rear view of 
them, is like an emanation. It is palpable. It is of bore-
dom. 
4. Virtually every observed classroom communicates, 
through these phenomena, a quality of generalized, ritu-
alized, formalistic purposelessness, a quality of simply 
getting something over with. 
In time, intrigued by all this, I attempted to build a con-
ceptual model of the classroom, using a brainstorming tech-
nique that I often employ in model-building workshops.2 
Starting with a simple observation, or a set of them such as I 
had already made, the technique is to generate as many ex-
planations as possible for the observation and then to con-
ceptualize an explanatory or descriptive model that will al-
low for all the explanations. 
A complete list of all the possible explanations would be 
far too long; but here are a few of the more obvious ones: 
1. Professors lecture because their responsibility is to 
cover material and there are precious few alternatives to 
lecturing for delivery of the material. 
2. Professors lecture because to do otherwise would be to 
lose control. 
3. Professors believe students wouldn't understand any 
classroom procedure other than lecturing. 
4. Professors believe they get paid to "teach" (i.e., do all 
the work) and activities such as small group work or dis-
cussions, which cause the students to work, are not fair to 
them. (A senior professor actually said this to me once.) 
5. Students come into class expecting to be bored by lec-
turing, therefore they are bored and emerge bored, and 
professors simply play into such expectations. 
Given these and numerous other possible explanations 
for my observations, the model that emerges is an obvious 
one. It squares firmly with much basic learning theory: 
P = f([Ei + E 2 ] x R ) 
Here, P stands for professorial performance, E i is pro-
fessorial experience, E 2 is professorial expectations, and R 
represents student response to the process. In the classrooms 
I had been observing, student response had been quite pas-
sive, which is to say virtually nonexistent, hence as a factor 
in the formula it had little or no significance. 
The hypothesis that arises from the model—compel-
lingly, I believe—is this: 
University classroom teaching practice is in general an 
artifact of professors having learned to teach under tradi-
tional pedagogical regimes. Traditional methods tend to 
be authoritarian, non-participative, curriculum-centered 
rather than student- or problem-centered. Hence they stand 
in opposition to democratic values, paradoxically the foun-
dation of the society in which teaching institutions are 
embedded. 
The probability is that such observations, leading to the 
same hypothesis, could be made as a matter of course through 
roaming the halls of most other institutions of higher learn-
ing. Classroom behavior on the part of professors is not a 
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matter of widespread or systematic critique. Indeed, an ab-
sence of critique is the rule. My experience has been that 
professorial behavior in the classroom is very much a subject 
not to be discussed by professors in forum; for instance, in 
faculty meetings. Certainly, it is discussed ad infinitum by 
students, thus it would seem to be in the category of what 
Victor Thompson calls "forbidden knowledge."3 It is in the 
rhetoric on non-traditional institutions where the evidence is 
to be found, and there it takes the form of: "We do (or try to 
do) things in our classrooms that mainstream, traditional in-
stitutions don't do (or don't know how to do). In that respect 
importantly, among a number of others, we are not like them." 
Examples include: 
1. A Pacific Northwest state college, chartered as an "al-
ternative" institution, repeats over and over again in its 
literature that the seminar and discussion, not the lecture, 
are the norm in its classrooms. 
2. The St. John's Colleges, founded on the Great Books 
curriculum, call all their faculty "tutors," without academic 
rank, and expect tutors to act as Socratic discussion leaders 
in class. Lecturing is specifically discouraged as a class-
room strategy. In practice, the less said in class by a tutor, 
the better. 
3. The external degree-completion programs of a number 
of colleges and universities, focused on adult learners, re-
quire their potential faculty to demonstrate the skills of 
"facilitators" of learning, and claim to value those skills 
more than subject matter knowledge. 
4. Similarly, "andragogical" literature makes clear that 
normative classroom behavior on the part of professors is 
simply not healthy in an adult learning situation.4 
It would seem that the battle for student-centered, partici-
pative, non-autocratic teaching has been pretty well aban-
doned in "traditional" institutions, if it was ever fought there, 
and is now carried on, instead, primarily in non-mainstream, 
non-traditional institutions, in adult-only programs, and in 
non-institutional learning, such as corporate management de-
velopment programs.5 If that is so, then the gap between 
teaching behavior and democratic values is broadening, which 
strikes me as a matter of considerable concern. It also sends 
me, for guidance and perhaps for solace, back to the educator 
and philosopher who, more than any other, perceived and 
articulated the "embeddedness" of teaching in democratic 
society: John Dewey. I shall discuss Dewey in that context 
in the pages to follow. 
Having turned to Dewey for enlightenment, I shall then 
have reference to another thinker, the psychologist Kurt 
Lewin, whose notions in the domain of social change are in 
striking harmony with Dewey's in the domain of education. 
In attempting a synthesis of the democratically-informed ideas 
of these two men, I shall try to delineate a set of principles 
for teaching in higher education that might help us to direct 
our attention to the topic in a fresh way. 
II. 
"Essentially what Dewey wanted to do," Joel H. Spring 
tells us, "was give meaning to the fragmented experiences of 
the world of modern man."6 
In this essay I am not prepared to struggle with the criti-
cisms of Dewey and of "progressive education." Surely many 
of Dewey's experiments, as well as those of his followers, 
went awry, and surely some of the criticism has been deserved. 
The sadness is that the Deweyan model has been so gener-
ally ignored, if not rejected. The irony is that it has been 
rejected, for the most part, for what are popularly judged to 
be experimental failures, when the essence of Deweyan edu-
cation was experiment itself. In fact, Dewey must be given 
primary credit for the stimulating notion of the "experiment-
ing society."7 
Experimentation is the essence of pragmatism—an inte-
gral part of the Deweyan heritage—as it is of personal growth 
and development; just as it is (as Dewey often reminded us) 
of the maintenance and preservation of a democratic society. 
Experimentation also demands tolerance for error and mis-
takes. To employ the Deweyan educational paradigm is to 
run totally counter to the dreary ethos of the typical class-
room. For Dewey, as Jerome Nathanson put it, 
Education... is not to be viewed passively, as the means by 
which already established knowledge is poured into the 
receptacles that are [students]. On the contrary, education 
is first and foremost a matter of active participation.8 
Besides his fame as an educator and educational theorist, 
and his role as founder, along with William James and Charles 
Sanders Pierce, of American pragmatism, Dewey was a com-
pelling teacher, as Mervyn L. Cadwallader has pointed out.9 
Unfortunately, we cannot be sure what his style, approach, 
and method were, though much can be inferred. It is clear 
that he came early to the observations and speculations that 
were to inform his eventual method and approach. Here is a 
passage from an essay published in 1888: 
[T]he chief intellectual defect found in pupils [is] lack of 
flexibility, lack of ability to turn the mind towards new ideas, 
or look at old ones in new lights. There is a helplessness 
towards what lies outside of the wonted grooves of 
thought.10 
Clearly this is the same helplessness seen by Edgar Z. 
Friedenberg more than 75 years later. Friedenberg postu-
lated psychologically and societally disastrous results from a 
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system based on teacher control, student subordination, and 
enforced passivity. "Students," he said, "do not resent [such 
total control and authority]; that is the tragedy. All weakness 
tends to corrupt, and impotence corrupts absolutely."11 Surely, 
this is a helplessness, an impotence that can only persist and 
be perpetuated under the influence of teachers who them-
selves are reluctant or unable to move outside of their "wonted 
grooves of thought." 
That Dewey, at the tender age of 27 or so, was already 
speculating on the same questions that would preoccupy him 
throughout his long career as an educator, is demonstrated 
by this elegant passage: 
How can we make the mind, not more mature, but more 
receptive to ideas; how can we cultivate, not a higher grade 
of intelligence, but spontaneity of action?12 
Though not yet visibly connecting the differing notions, 
Dewey was already toying with ideas germane to both edu-
cational experimentation and the democratic ethos. He was 
already deeply, impressively focused on the basic relation-
ship between teacher and learner: 
The student deals, not with a material foreign to himself, 
by which he may be hampered, but with himself. He must 
discover the very material of the study. Nor can rules of 
discovery be externally laid down for him in routine meth-
ods to which he must conform. The ways of getting at the 
material and of treating it must be left to himself. The 
teacher's function must be largely one of awakening, of 
stimulation.13 
And it follows from this that 
[T]he test of the teaching will after all be the degree in 
which the mind is awakened and is given ability to act for 
itself.14 
These early excursions by Dewey into educational phi-
losophy and practice cannot have been based upon a great 
foundation of experience, a least as a teacher. Perhaps as a 
student, with a wonderfully developed reflexive objectivity, 
he was able to reach such clear early formulations. One won-
ders if he might not have been a rebel against the teaching to 
which he had been subjected as a student. 
In any case, not many years later (1890) Dewey had al-
ready formulated what was to be, until the end, the core of 
his educational philosophy: 
[T]he college student should require of his college course 
that it give him that sense of the proportions and right val-
ues which can come only of centering all studies in their 
human relationships.1-15 
By 1897, and approaching early middle age, the philoso-
pher was expressing a point of view which carries an under-
tone of annoyance, if not exasperation, with conventional 
teaching practices: 
Judgment as the sense of relative values involves ability to 
select, to discriminate, by reference to a standard. Acquir-
ing information can therefore never develop the power of 
judgment.16 
And: 
[T]he active side precedes the passive in the development 
of the student's nature [T]he neglect of this principle is 
the cause of a large part of the waste of time and strength in 
school work. The [student] is thrown into a passive. . . 
a t t i tude. . . . [T]he result is friction and waste.17 
Dewey as pragmatic philosopher and ethicist; Dewey as 
psychologist, educator, and educational theorist: these are 
two tremendously influential personae that are well-remem-
bered in America, whether favorably or otherwise. The third, 
and by no means least important, part of Dewey the man and 
thinker was that of the theorist and advocate of democracy 
and human freedom. 
In a brilliant essay published at the age of 29 (1888), 
Dewey developed his theory of democracy, a nugget of analy-
sis that was to stay basically intact throughout his career. He 
began with a defense of democracy from those who saw it as 
merely another form of government or as a Hobbesian ag-
glomeration of otherwise non-social beings: 
Society in its unified and structural character is the fact of the 
case; the non-social individual is an abstraction arrived at by 
imagining what man would be if all his human qualities were 
taken away.18 
He proceeded then to his basic metaphor, democracy-as-
organism: 
I f . . . society be truly described as organic, the citizen is a mem-
ber of the organism, and, just in proportion to the perfection of 
the organism, has concentrated within himself its intelligence 
and will. Disguise it as we may, this theory can have but one 
result, that of the sovereignty of the citizen.19 
Finally, in a statement that could be construed as the essence 
of Dewey the democrat: 
[Democracy is an ethical idea, the idea of a personality, with 
truly infinite capacity, incorporate with every man. Democracy 
and the one, the ultimate, ethical idea of humanity are to my 
mind synonyms.20 
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I spoke earlier about Dewey's notion of the "experiment-
ing society," the implication of which is a direct legacy from 
philosophical pragmatist, the image of which is holistic, the 
thrust of which is profoundly democratic. As one might ex-
pect, Dewey expanded his pragmatism to virtually every facet 
of human associated life. In terms of formal organization, 
for example, Dewey hypothesized (perhaps more hopefully 
than realistically) that "the relation of individual freedom to 
organization is seen to be an experimental affair." And that 
is because: 
Organization tends to become rigid and to limit freedom. In 
addition to security and energy in action, novelty, risk, change 
are ingredients of the freedom which men desire. Variety is more 
than the spice of life; it is largely of its essence, making a differ-
ence between the free and the enslaved.21 
It is as a passionate advocate of human freedom, albeit a 
pragmatic one, that Dewey crystallizes his philosophy of edu-
cation, even when education is not the subject: 
Choice is an element in freedom and there can be no choice 
without unrealized and precarious possibilities. . . Variability, 
initiative, innovation, departure from routine, experimentation 
are empirically the manifestation of a genuine nisus in things. 
At all events it is these things that are precious to us under the 
name of freedom.2 2 
In later life, Dewey published The Public and Its Prob-
lems (1924), in which the original, youthful theme of the 
democratic "organism" still prevailed. The basic reasoned 
"faith" and advocacy remained: 
Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other 
principles of associated life. It is the idea of community life 
itself.23 
But throughout the book there is a note of relative pessi-
mism, of a sense of muted frustration, perhaps because, at 
the age of 52, Dewey had not yet seen the democratic reality 
approach the democratic ideal. He had seen too much of the 
growth of government, of the efficiency criterion, of benevo-
lent repression. Beginning with Woodrow Wilson, whose 
influence upon the growth of professionalism in governmen-
tal bureaucracy is today little known but in the early years of 
the century was considerable, government had increasingly 
become one of experts, the "masses" becoming less and less 
fully informed and involved.24 To counter that ominous de-
velopment, Dewey returned to an old stand and to his origi-
nal unit of analysis, the individual, growthful, responsible, 
educated human being. Indeed, the following statement is a 
precis of Dewey's educational philosophy, though uttered in 
the context of a discussion of democratic values: 
To learn to be human is to develop through the give-and-take of 
communication an effective sense of being an individually dis-
tinctive member of a community; one who understands and ap-
preciates its beliefs, desires and methods, and who contributes 
to a further conversion of organic powers into human resources 
and values.25 
The statement is an astonishing, if somewhat more "prag-
matic" echo of a much earlier (1897) assertion about teach-
ing and learning: 
[A]ll education proceeds by the participation of the individual 
in the social consciousness of the race.2 6 
Dewey's preoccupation was with teaching and learning, and 
with the development of a free, autonomous, experimenting 
human organism as part of the greater democratic, organic 
whole. And, according to Nathanson, Dewey never wavered 
in his central focus: 
The key problem of democratic education. . . is to devise meth-
ods that will stimulate the development of individual possibili-
ties, whatever they are, and regardless of traditionally accepted 
views of "learning."27 
Beyond almost all people of his time and ours, Dewey 
possessed the enormous ability to conceptualize at a global 
level and then, as if instantaneously, to project that 
conceptualization to the most finite and practical (or prag-
matic) level. Given his training, predilections, and experi-
ence, he always returned from a focus upon the philosophi-
cal-ontological universe to examine with wonder the devel-
opment of the individual human being. 
in. 
The key to [achieving social change] is a clear conception of 
consequences wanted, and of the technique for reaching them, 
together wi th . . . the state of desires and aversions which cause 
some consequences to be wanted rather than others.28 
The statement is from Dewey's The Public and Its Prob-
lems. It summarizes what he saw as a process of citizen and 
citizen-group inquiry, experimentation, and learning, toward 
achieving social goals within a community. It could as well 
have been written by Kurt Lewin, a German-born pioneer in 
Gestalt psychology, who came to this country in the early 
1930s and became known in time as the father of much of 
what we know about human motivation, particularly in groups 
and organizations. It is to Lewin that we owe the term and 
procedures of Action Research (Dewey's "conception of con-
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sequences and the technique for reaching them," to be devel-
oped and acquired by the actors involved), and the social 
notion of levels of aspiration (Dewey's "state of desires and 
aversions"), which so strongly influence the extent to which 
we are motivated to seek goals. 
Unlike Dewey, Lewin was in no discoverable way an ideo-
logue. He seems instead to have regarded himself, and to 
have proceeded in his psychological investigations, as a 
"pure" scientist. Like Dewey, he was an avid experimenter, 
but unlike him, the many experiments carried on by him and 
his successors tended to be consistently successful in the sense 
of being syncretically conclusive. It is that cumulative con-
clusiveness that has made the Lewinian legacy an important 
one. The relative scientific purity of the Lewinian experi-
mental tradition has contributed to a set of findings which 
incidentally strengthen democratic values, especially in that 
part of human associated life that is lived in formal organiza-
tions. 
What was probably Lewin's most famous experiment took 
place during World War II, when he was on the faculty of 
The University of Iowa, and he was asked by the federal Of-
fice of Price Administration to find a way to influence Ameri-
can housewives to cook and serve such meats as heart, brains, 
kidneys, and the like, so that prime cuts could be shipped 
overseas to support the war effort.29 Lewin used as his ex-
perimental subjects group of Red Cross volunteers—Iowa 
City housewives, for the most part. The approach he used 
with half the groups was this: A dietitian came to group meet-
ings, and made a formal lecture complete with flipcharts and 
other display paraphernalia. The approach was essentially 
teacher-to-students. With the other groups, the dietitian sat 
in as a consultant, and asked the women to think about the 
problem: How to get "housewives like us" to change their 
meat-buying behavior. The approach here was essentially 
participative. 
In a follow-up study several months after the group ses-
sions, Lewin found that 32% of the women in the participa-
tive groups had indeed served the meats in question, while 
only 3% of lectured-to women had done so. 
From this set of experiments (perhaps trivial-seeming, 
today) came the notion that if a solution to a problem is "im-
posed" upon a group, its members will not be highly moti-
vated to pursue it, whereas if the solution is the group's "own," 
that is, one in which they have and feel ownership, an ac-
ceptable solution is much more likely, and behavior change 
is much more lasting. As Lewin laconically noted, 
Lecturing is a procedure in which the audience is chiefly passive. The 
discussion, if conductcd correctly, is likely to lead to a much higher 
degree of involvement.30 
Such Lewinian insights have had profound effects on the 
study of modern organizations, if not on the actual practice 
of management. Here are a few of the more important as-
pects of that set of effects: 
1) Lewin's investigations of social change convinced him 
that if a group is immediately involved in solving its own 
community problems, and is provided with the appropriate 
conceptual and tactical tools, it will invariably solve its own 
problems better than can outside experts. From this basic 
idea has come Action Research, an approach that informs 
virtually the whole field of Organization Development, a 
movement in turn based upon relatively radical notions of 
organizational power-sharing.31 
2) Field theory, a Lewinian construct which sees the hu-
man being as a goal-seeking creature endeavoring to extend 
his boundaries, his field or "life space," has been instrumen-
tal in many variations of what has come to be called the "Hu-
man Potential" movement. As with Dewey, the individual is 
the proper unit of analysis, even in large-scale change, and to 
understand an individual's need for change, it is necessary to 
understand his aspirations and to view the universe of change 
from his unique perspective.32 
3) Lewin's notions about behavioral change (the well-
known cycle: a) create dissatisfaction; b) "unfreeze" behav-
ior, c) reinforce new behavior; d) "refreeze") have been enor-
mously influential in the whole organizational change move-
ment3 3 
While I would not have the temerity to claim that the 
change movement, with its focus on humanistic values, has 
been overwhelmingly successful, nevertheless it has had broad 
and virtually universal impact. Managerial behaviors have 
changed, as have organizational policies towards people. 
While in most cases the workplace is far from democratic, 
there is considerable evidence that managerial awareness of 
the embeddedness of the workplace in a democratic society 
has grown considerably, and that growth of awareness is a 
result of the organizational change movement, itself greatly 
influenced by Lewin. A correspondingly widespread change, 
in the college and university classroom, influenced by Dewey 
or anyone else, has not happened. 
IV. 
I hope, at this point, that my essay is not being read as a 
simple plea to college professors to learn techniques alterna-
tive to lecturing, thence to become facilitators of group pro-
cess through some instant metamorphosis. While that is a 
pleasant notion, it is obviously simplistic and only a small 
item in a much larger framework. I am proposing instead a 
new model, a fresh paradigm, through a synthesis of some of 
the ideas of Dewey and Lewin, for the college teacher as prac-
titioner. That paradigm includes four basic elements, which 
I shall present and discuss in descending order of level of 
abstraction. 
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1. First, the professor as practitioner needs to become 
acutely aware of the societal embeddedness of his or her craft 
and the institution in which that craft is practiced. There is 
no question in my mind that the enhanced awareness must be 
of democracy and democratic values. There is no other fac-
tor approaching equal significance in defining our western, 
American society. Such an awareness goes beyond mere 
notions of academic freedom, according to which focus, as 
Cadwallader has noted, "the survival of our political democ-
racy requires teachers who are free to examine the unortho-
dox and the unpopular, and free to teach c r i t i c i s m . " ^ i n -
stead, it includes a realization that the classroom is itself an 
integer of democratic society, and that in any such integer 
there are important issues of ownership, a la Lewin. That is 
to say, the students "own" the system and the process as much 
as does the professor. This does not mean that the professor 
abdicates responsibility, or that he or she surrenders power. 
Instead, both responsibility and power are voluntarily shared. 
Such an understanding can lead to profound changes in be-
havior on the part of both parties. 
2. As a practitioner, the professor becomes reflexive, sen-
sitive to what works and what doesn't. He or she becomes a 
practitioner of the pragmatic. No longer does the lecture (or 
the slide-show, or even the role-play or the discussion) drone 
on and on without consideration of its impact, of its effec-
tiveness in the learning process. Accordingly, the professor 
becomes a reflector upon action, rather than merely the only 
actor in the scene, unconcerned about whether the audience 
responds or not. He or she consciously begins to employ 
reflection-in-action, which Donald A. Schon describes as "on-
the-spot surfacing, criticizing, restructuring, and testing of 
intuitive understandings of experienced phenomena."35 This 
kind of stance, integrated through courageous experiment and 
application, will lead a professor inevitably to consideration 
of useful alternatives to lecturing and student passivity. In-
deed, the shift should be not only profound and immediate, 
but truly "owned" by the professor, hence internalized and 
lasting. 
3. Having succeeded with mastery of the first two ele-
ments of the paradigm, the professor will now move with 
relative ease to the third: to the modeling of democratic val-
ues by his or her classroom behavior. Again, such a shift 
need not involve radical changes, such as abdication of re-
sponsibility or power, or the watering-down of academic sub-
stance. I speak here only of the likely development of a new 
set of competencies which are congruent with the sort of 
modeling suggested. They include listening, confirmation, 
support, and encouragement, the challenging Socratic ques-
tion, tolerance for ambiguity, willingness to forego closure, 
and above all, ability and willingness to learn from the re-
sulting interchange with students. 
4. Finally, the academic practitioner will come to see him-
self or herself in a truly different role. No longer the auto-
crat, the sole arbiter of wisdom, the only dispenser of "cogni-
tive input," the professor becomes the manager of a learning 
process, indeed the facilitator of change and growth. A pro-
found personal, behavioral shift will have been accomplished, 
one that can accurately be described as a shift from a teach-
ing orientation to a learning orientation. 
Here, however, I must tread carefully, because there are 
many who would reject if not resent such labels as "man-
ager" and "facilitator." May they continue to do so; I do not 
seek or advise new labels, I seek only changes in practice. 
But no matter the self-applied rubric, there will be recogni-
tion of some new classroom persona, once the first three con-
ceptual levels have been integrated. 
V. 
John Dewey and Kurt Lewin were both eminently practi-
cal men, as well as profound thinkers and dedicated demo-
crats. The beauty of the performance achieved by practitio-
ners (in any field), once they understand and have assimi-
lated Dewey and Lewin, is that life becomes easier rather 
than harder, being among people more rewarding rather than 
less, teaching both more stimulating and more challenging 
while far less of a chore. The ultimate reward, it seems to 
me, is not just experiencing the excitement of becoming more 
process-aware and process-oriented, but of being keenly 
aware of having become part of the process itself, rather than 
of the problem. 
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